巴菲特最经典的演讲：价值投资（二） 没有认知，那就死磕学习！今天分享股神沃伦-巴菲特1998年在佛罗里达大学的演讲，据传这近一个半小时的演讲公认是巴菲特最经典的演讲，中国股神段永平声称听了不下10遍。整段演讲内容尽显巴菲特践行终身的投资智慧——价值投资。 此为价值投资演讲第二段，此后将陆续更新，敬请期待！#认知 #投资 #价值投资 #巴菲特 #段永平推荐

Thing there, but as long as one percent, keep looking, yeah. They were rumored to be one of the rescue buyers of Long Term Capital. What was the play there? What did you see? Well, there's a story. The current *Fortune* magazine has Robert Murdoch's picture on the cover, it tells the whole story of our involvement. It's kind of an interesting story, but it's a long story, so I won't go into all the background. But I got a really serious call about Long Term Capital four weeks ago this Friday, whenever it was. It was my granddog's birthday, I got the call mid-afternoon, and my granddaughter was having her birthday party that evening. Then I was flying that night to Seattle to go on a 12-day trip with Gates, on a private train to all sorts of places, where I was really out of communication. But I got this call on a Friday afternoon saying that things were really getting serious there. I'd had some other calls before that, the article gets into a few weeks later. I know those people, most of them pretty well, they all came from Solomon when I was there. And the crisis was important, the Fed was sending people up that weekend. So between that Friday and the following Wednesday, the New York Fed, in effect, orchestrated a rescue effort, but without any federal money involved. I was quite active, but I was having this terrible time because we were saving up. There are some canyons, which held no interest for me, whatever I asked to go, the campaign was saying, you know, we just stare over here. We might see some bears and what else, and I said, still, where can you get a good satellite connection? Because I want... 是啊。 So that was the situation. First, all my faith was going off behind me, and I got my back turned, the phone was with the people. The group was getting everything set, working the phone, but we put it all together on Wednesday morning. I was by that point, I was enough. 包子们满天的，and I talked to Ghana, 还在那儿发展我的，about ten o'clock, I know they were having the bankers meet at ten o'clock in the morning in New York. And I called him, like we actually delivered the message when he called me out there. And I looked for ten, we are diamond. We made a bid. It was a mess because it was being done from a long distance and everything. It was really a bit of a mess. But in the end, I made a bid for two hundred and fifty million, essentially for the net assets of Long Term Capital. But we would have put in three and three quarters billion on top of that. And it would have been three billion from Berkshire Hathaway, one hundred million from AIG and three hundred million from Goldman Sachs. And we stipulated that we put a very short time vise on it, because when you're dealing with one hundred billion dollars worth of securities that are moving around, you don't want to leave a fixed price bid out. They're very long post. We were worried about it getting shocked. In the end, the bankers made the deal, but it was an interesting period. The whole Long Term Capital Management that I hope most of you are familiar with, the whole story is really 半十来的，没够成. If you take John Meriwether, Arly, Larry Hill and Greg Hawkins, the two Nobel Prize winners, Merton and Scholes, if you take the sixteen of them, they have as high an average IQ as any sixteen people working together in one business in the country, including at Microsoft. Or wherever you want to name. So there's incredible amount of intellect in that room. Now you combine that with the fact that those sixteen had extensive experience in the field they're operating. These were not a bunch of guys who made their money selling men's clothing, and then all of a sudden went into this hedge fund business. The sixteen of them probably had three hundred and fifty or four hundred years of experience doing exactly what they were doing. And then you throw in the third factor: most of them had virtually all of their very substantial net worths in the business. So they had their own money up, hundreds of millions of dollars, so their motive is super high. And they're working in a field they know. And essentially they went broke. And that to me is absolutely fascinating. I would write a book, it's going to be called *Why Smart People Do Dumb Things*. My partner says that should be my autobiography. But this might be an interesting illustration, and these are perfectly decent guys. I respect them, and they helped me out when I had problems with Salomon. And they are not bad people at all. Why, to make money they didn't have and didn't need, they risk what they did have and did need? And that's foolish. That is just plain foolish. It doesn't matter what your IQ is. If you risk something that is important to you for something that is unimportant to you, it just does not make any sense. I don't care whether the odds are one hundred to one that you succeed or a thousand to one. You see, if you have a gun with a thousand chambers, a million chambers, and there's a bullet in one chamber, and you put it up to your temple, how much do you want to be paid to pull the trigger? I'm not going to do it, you know, you can name any sum you want, but it doesn't do anything for me. 你要甩呢。 And I think the downside is fairly clear, I'm not interested in that kind of a game. And yet people do it financially, without thinking about it very much. It was a great book, a lousy book with a great title, by Walter Gutman. The title was *You Only Have to Get Rich Once*. 知道吧？ And seems pretty fundamental, doesn't it? What difference does it make if you've got one hundred million dollars at the start of the year, and you're going to make ten percent unleveraged and twenty percent leveraged ninety-nine times out of a hundred, what difference will it make at the end of the year, where you've got a hundred and ten million, or a hundred and twenty million? It makes no difference at all. I mean, if you die at the end of the year, the guy writing your obituary may say one hundred and ten, if you have a hundred and twenty, you're getting nothing at all. It makes absolutely no difference, makes no difference to your family, makes no difference to anything. 嗯，是的。 And yet the downside, playing with other people's money, it's not only losing all your money, but it's disgrace and humiliation, and facing friends whose money you lost. I just can't imagine an equation that makes sense for that, and yet sixteen guys with very high IQs, very decent people, ended up in that game. And I think it's madness, and it's produced by an overreliance, to some extent, on things. Those guys would tell me back when I was at Salomon that a six sigma event wouldn't touch us, or seven sigma. They were wrong. Their history does not tell you the probabilities of future financial things happening, and they had a great reliance on mathematics, and they felt that the data told you something about the risk of a stock. But it doesn't tell you a damn thing about the risk of a stock, in my view. The signals did not tell you the risk of going broke, in my view.